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UNIFORMITY IN THE MARITIME LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (II).*
Recognition cf the Doctrine: The Later Period.
In the history of our maritime law, much favors and much
is opposed to the ideal of uniformity. Judges and others, differ-
ing as to its recognition as a rule of law, select whatever favors
the position they are taking and declare that it illustrates the
general rule, and that all the rest turns upon special, peculiar con-
siderations. "As to the spectre of a lack of uniformity," said
Justice Holmes, "I content myself with referring to The Ham ii-
ton, 207 U. S. 398,4o6." 1 The Hamilton, in short stands for
the general rule. Justice McReynolds, however, regards this case
as the exception 2 and deducles his general rule from other cases.
Learned justices here, as elsewhere, pass each other by, going
rapidly in opposite- directions, without any real clash. Their opin-
ions merely show that they disagree. A is so, B is not, says one:
B is so, A is not says the other. Since they differ, they owe it
to each other and to us to justify their contradictions. Justice
Holmes should have explained why lack of uniformity is merely
a spectre ("a ghostly apparition" . . . "an appearance of the
* Continued from 73 U. oF PA. L. Rev. x23-14r.
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dead as when living"-Cent. Dic.) ; Justice McReynolds, why his
authorities really stand for uniformity, and why in principle it is
desirable.
This phenomenon is also illustrated in the attitude taken
towards the cases which establish that admiralty courts alone
may entertain proceedings to enforce a maritime lien, our next
subject for discussion. Justice McReynolds relied upon the first
of these (The Moses Taylor 1) in establishing his major premise,
-that is, as showing that state statutes may not contravene the
general maritime law.4 Justice Holmes declared that-this case
is not in point,5 and Justice Pitney: "Those remedies - whicu
were held not to be common law remedies, within the saving
clause, in The Moses Taylor . provided for imposing a
lien on the ship by proceedings in the nature of the admiralty
process ii rei, and it was for this reason only that they were
held to trench upon the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States. . . . Where a state statute con-
ferred a lien operative strictly in rein, it was uniformly held not
enforceable in the state courts, but only because it trenched upon
the peculiar jurisdiction of the admiralty, and therefore was not
a "common-law remedy," within the saving clause of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789." 6
According to Justice Pitney, therefore, there was a peculiar
jurisdiction or, rather, process, which the admiralty alone might
enforce. His assumptions are that the process was sufficiently
peculiar to be differentiated from common law process, and that
jurisdiction to enforce it was exclusively given to admiralty
courts by the Constitution. In short, such exclusiveness has an
historical sanction, and, since he was answering Justice McRey-
nolds, it has no other sanction. It depends upon mere history,
and so far as the doctrine of uniformity is concerned has no
bearing at all. This was apparently Justice Holmes' view also.
' Thr Moses Taylor. 4 WVall. 411 (z866).
'Southern Pacific Co. v. Jonson, 26.
6p. 2=2.
GPP. 236, 238.
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A result reached on historical grounds cannot be made the basis
for what might be called a sociological conclusion. NVe must take
judges at their word. Inclusio Uitius est c.rlusio alterius. Other
premises, inarticulate in the actual opinion, must be rigidly ex-
cluded.
Even though it be conceded that historical truth is less im-
portant in the actual development of the law than what judges
conceive to be the truth, even though we no longer believe that
having destroyed the historical precedents for a decision that
decision is at once necessarily wrong, even though in the present
case if the decision in question was based on a certain concep-
tion of legal history wholly dissociated from the doctrine of uni-
formity, it does not greatly matter whether that conception was
well or ill founded, the dissociation being the same in either case,
it is perhaps worth while to consider how -far the rule of The
Moses Taylor and of The Hine v. Trevor and later cases 7 has a
proven historical basis, and how far, indeed, the opinions there
uttered did purport to follow history.
Every one will admit that if judges invent "history" to
justify a conclusion, what they have invented is not really history.
The law may be what they declare it to be, but the same is not
true of history, even though lawyers frequently prefer a judicial
declaration as to what history is to the evidence in the sources
relied upon by historians. Of course no one accuses Justices
Pitney and Holmes of having invented history; at most they
merely misconceived it; but I venture to say that there is no
proven sound historical basis for the rule of the cases above re-
ferred to, and, further, that those decisions themselves do riot
wholly correspond to the best guess that we can make at actual
historical conditions.
At the time of the Constitution, a proceeding directed primar-
ily, in form at least, against a vessel or her proceeds, or against
cargo or its proceeds, was undoubtedly the usual one in the ad-
'4 Wali. 5 (866); The Belfaxt, 7 Wall. 624 (x868); The Glide, 167
U. S. 606 (iS97) ; The Robert TV. Parsons, x91 U. S. 17 (1go3) ; Rounds v.
Cloverport Foundry Co., 237 U. S. 303 (1915).
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miralty courts, but proceedings against named individuals, seek-
ing money judgments without reference to any particular thing,
did also occur.' The first method of proceeding certainly differed
in form from those known to the then common law, in which
property was attached. But whether the difference went deeper
than mere form it is impossible to say with certainty. The mere
fact that a particular object, rather than a person, is named as
adversary to the plaintiff and that the human beings, really in-
terested, are cited as its owners, rather than as "defendants" may
later breed many consequences in legal theory, but is in itself un-
important. Unless we imply those consequences from the forui
or find evidence that they legally existed, we are not justified in
regarding the admiralty process as sufficiently peculiar to justify
our believing that anyone intended a particular rule of jurisdic-
tion in regard thereto. One of the most striking incidents of the
admiralty action in rem as we now know it is, of course, the fact
that on a sale a title"good against the world"passes. I have found
no evidence that this incident attended the admiralty process as
known at the time of the Constitution. Such process, as described
in Browne, does not necessarily carry with it that incident in
instance cases. 9 It should be remembered that English practice
may well have been the model for our own, and that whatever the
rule may have been in prize cases it was not settled till later that
these were "admiralty" and not something special.10 The mari-
'An examination of the state admiralty cases reported in Peters' Admi-
ralty Decisions, Bee's Reports. and Hopkinson's Miscellaneous Essays. shows
the following proceedings in personam in the Admiralty Court of Pennsylvania:
Dean v. Angus. Bee 369. 378 (two cases. i785); Smith v. Leard, Bee i99
(1784); Anderson v. Forbes. Bee 2oo (1786); Dixneuf v. Lacaze, 3 Hop.
Misc. Essays 69 (s78o); Marau v. Baudoin, 2 Pet. Adm. 475 (1788). See,
also, Brevoor v. The Ship Fair American, i Pet. Adm. Dec. 87, 94-5 (Dist.
Ct., Pa., iSo). For Massachusetts, see The Undecriter. 119 Fed. 713,
735 (Dist. Ct., Mass., 19o-). But cf. Scollay v. Dunn, Quincy 74 (1763);
Montgomery v. Wharton. Bee 388 (Adm. Ct., Pa.. T78o). The power of a
federal admiralty court to proceed it personain was definitely settled at least
as early as 1825: Manro v. Almeida, io WliVat. 743.
' Civil Law and Admiralty (first ed. 1798), chapter o. The earliest case dis-
covered is also explainable on other grounds: Trump v. Ship Thomas, Bee
86 (Dist. Ct., S. C., 17,6). Possibly Judge Burrell in England held this view
even earlier: Marsden's Burrell's Reports, 383. By 1813. however, the rule
seems to have becn recognized: The Fortitude, 7 Cranch 423; see, also, The
Mary. 9 Cranch 126. 144 (18*5).
4Glass v. The Sloop Betsy, 3 Dall. 6 (1794).
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time lien, the existence of which is of course not necessarily in-
volved in the existence of the action in rem, was at best in-
choate."1 Talk was of hypothecations and material men's liens,.
usually based upon possession, and these may of course have ef-
fective legal existence without the coexistence of the right to
proceed in ren as we know it today. Indeed, it is not too much
to say that maritime liens did not take form here until many
years later; and continental law, particularly with reference to
the privilege, was of great influence.1 2  That fully developed
legal institution, which we sonietimes refer to as the maritime
lien and sometimes as the right i ren, because with us the two
go together, but which really is a combination of two more or
less different things, was known and considered in Tie Moses
Taylor. Only by assuming a great deal, however, can we say
that it was known at the time of the Constitution. If known at
all, it was known at best as a mere budding thing, for certainly
a budding thing was all it then was. Its major legal incident-
the persistence of the lien in spite of subsequent changes in title
in the property enlienated, necessarily based upon the power of
the court to deal with the property as property and not merely
with a respondent's interest therein-is certainly not shown to
have been then clearly recognized. Unless we can prove that the
framers knew an institution, we are scarcely justified in saying
that they intended to perpetuate it. All we can surely say they
knew was that, in admiralty, process usually ran against . thing,
and, at common law, against a person, a difference of small im-
portance taken by itself, as has been shown. In short, how can
we say that the framers conceived of admiralty process as dif-
fering in any considerable degree from that known to the coin-
mon law?
' R. G. Marsden, 1 Select Pleas Adm., lxxi, lxxii; Roscoe's Adm. Prac-
tice, 4th ed., 3z ef seq.; z Halsbury, Laws of England, "Admiralty," art. 88;
The Under-ricr. ix9 Fed 713, 721 Ct seq. For instances of growth in
England in the direction of the maritime lien, before the Constitution: see
Burrell, 62, ,6 (1767-68), 285 (17o3), 33, (786), 288 (7o5) ; and The Under-
wifer, 1o. cit.
2Cf. The Yourng Mec.anic, 2 Curtis 404 (Cir. Ct, Me., x855); The
Rebecca, i Ware 187 (DLt Ct., Me., 1831); The Undeii'triier, supra, 714
ef seq.; Vandeater r. Mills, ig How. 82 (1856).
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How can we say, therefore, that they, the framers, intended
a difference between jurisdiction to enforce a maritime lien by
process in rcm with this legal incident and jurisdiction to enforce
process in personam, the first to be exclusive in the federal courts,
the second concurrent in federal and state courts? It is as likely
that they intended jurisdiction of both to be exclusive or of both
to be concurrent.
Nor, in The Moses Taylor and its successors, do we find the
court relating the rule of exlusiveness in contrast to the rule of
concurrency, as Justice Pitney did, to an intent on the part of the
framers. Furthermore the field in which jurisdiction must be ex-
clusive is not always declared to be the field for which the best
historical argument can be made: cases where process is strictly
in rein, title on sale to be good against the world. History, in
other words, does not clearly support the historical argument on
which those cases are supposed to be based, nor are those cases
altogether based on the historical argument alleged. In The
Moses Taylor,13 action was brought in a state court under a state
statute against a vessel by name to enforce a maritime cpntracL
This process, Justice Field declared, was in nature and had the
incidents of a suit in admiralty, the characteristic feature of which
is that the vessel is impleaded as defendant and is judged and
sentenced accordingly. "It is this dominion of the suit in admi-
ralty over the vessel or thing itself which gives to the title made
under its decrees validity against all the world." (Of course
there is a non sequitur here. Impleading the vessel by name and
as defendant does not necessarily mean that the vessel may be
sold and a title passed free of all other claims or liens. Justice
Field assumed without inquiry that the California statute in-
tended a sale to have this effect.) He then points out that under
the Constitution, jurisdiction of some matters is exclusively in the
federal courts and of others concurrently in them and in the state
courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789, he says, proceeds on this
theory, wherein it gives exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts
of all admiralty and maritime cases. (It would therefore seem
3'4 Wall. 411 (x866).
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that according to him, the Constitution instead of sanctioning a
diffcrence between admiralty process and common law process so
far as jurisdiction goes, intended just the opposite.) He then
refers to the "saving clause" without expressing any opinion on its
constitutionality-unnecessary, because in this case it did not
"save"-and declares that it "only saves to suitors 'the right of
a common law remedy where the common law is competent to
give it.' It is not a remedy in the common law courts which is
saved, but a common law remedy. A proceeding in rein, as used
in the admiralty courts [at the time of the decision?], is not a
remedy afforded by the commou law; it is a proceeding under
the civil law. When used in the common law courts it is given
by statute."-Unless Justice Field believed the Judiciary Act to
be a contemporaneous interpretation of the Constitution 14 -there
is nothing to show he did-his opinion does not indicate that he
believed that exclusiveness and concurrency proceeded from the
Constitution itself.
On the other hand Justice Field does stress the really im-
portant feature of the right in rein, and seems to have had it prin-
cipally in mind throughout. Perhaps a state process without this
feature would have been held valid by him; but only if he had
also related concurrency of jurisdiction in personam to the Con-
stitution, as he did not do, could one find sanction for the his-
torical argument in his opinion. In the next case The Hib, v.
Trevor," Justice Miller, in holding that a proceeding authorized
by a state statute was of the sort within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the admiralty court, stressed its purely procedural fea-
tures, the facts that the vessel may be made defendant, that the
owners' names need not be mentioned, that the petition is in sub-
stance similar to a libel, that notice is in the nature of a monition,
and that the vessel may be condemned and sold. There is nothing
here clearly showing that he had in mind the effect of such a
sale, nor that the state statute did purport to authorize the pas-
"'See 73 U. or PA. L. REv. 12.
"4 Wail 555 (x866).
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sage of more than the owner's title. In The Belfast, however 16
the point emphasized by Justice Field was explicitly mentioned.
In Johnson v. Chicago and Pac. Elezyator Co.,17 Justice Blatch-
ford, in holding a statutory state proceeding not within the pro-
hibition, stressed the lack of the features relied upon by Justice
Miller. It is probable that only the defendant's title would pass un-
der a sale,18 but apparently for all that Justice Blatchford cared
the opposite might be true. In The Glide,19 Justice Gray held a
Massachusetts process invalid because it purported to give a lien,
that is, a right in the thing itself (jivs in re) as soon as the trans-
action occurred, and n't depending upon the bringing of a suit
for its enforceability. The reference to the jus in re may be the
equivalent of Justice Field's reasoning, but in some respects the
right a mere attaching creditor gets on seizure by the sheriff is a
jus in re. Perhaps a law differing from the ordinary attachment
only in the fact that the debtor's interest is subject to the creditor's
claim in preference to those of other's later actually "attaching
the property" would be invalid in the state courts according to
Justice.Gray, even though a sale under that law passed no more
than the debtor's interest. In the Robert W. Parsons,20 Justice
Brown differentiated attachments from proceedings in rem on
the ground that the former takes only the debtor's interest and
the latter is directly against the vessel as debtor or "offending
thing." Justice Hughes in Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry CO.,2 i
defined the process which a state court may not enforce in these
terms and in those of Justice Field as well. The result of these
divergent opinions may be that in a border line case it will be
hard to say whether the proceeding in question does or does not
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty court. It
can scarcely be said that historical evidence so meagre really sup-
ports definitions so different.
7 WaU. 624 (z868).
if19 U. S. 388 (1886).
Gindele v. Corrigan, 129 Ill. 8z .1889) ; Tugboat E. P. Dprr v. Wald-
ron, 62 Ill. 221 (87).
0 167 U. S. 6o6 (x897).
1i91 U. S. 17 (1903); cf. also Leon v. Galceran, it Wall. i8S (i8f).
X 237 U. S. 303 (191S).
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None of this is very conclusive one way or the other so far
as the doctrine of uniformity is concerned. For all that appears
in The Moses Taylor and The Hine v. Trevor, the problem pre-
sented was limited to the interests of the litigants in those cases.
But there can be no doubt that it had a much greater significance.
Many states, especially those in the west, were asserting for them-
selves the broadest possible power over transactions which now we
must admit to be maritime.2 2  They can scarcely be blamed, for
they had become familiar with water-borne commerce on the
great rivers and lakes in that region before it was settled that
transactions there were within *federal admiralty jurisdiction.
They legislated as to such commerce, copying largely from known
maritime legal institutions, and in particular those that related to
the maritime lien.23 Cases were decided under such laws without
thought of interference with federal jurisdiction and law .24 When
it was held that admiralty jurisdiction did extend to these waters,
the states were naturally disinclined to give up their budding
jurisprudence..2 5  The position they took, however, would have
led, not only to concurrency of jurisdiction in all maritime mat-
ters, but to concurrency of law as well. California, for example,
asserted a full state admiralty jurisdiction including the power to
decide such matters according to California law.2 6  The Moses
'See Gindele v. Corrigan, i2 Ill. 582 (1889); Reynolds v. The Favorite,
io Minn. 242 (1865); Parisot v. Helm, 52 Miss. 617 (1876); Keating v.
Spink, 3 Ohio St. io5 (1853); Campbell v. Sherman, 35 Wis. 103 (1874).
See also cases in note 26.
' See cases in the prcceding note for illustrations of state lien laws. Cf.
also Stewart v. Henry, 3 Bush. 438 (1867), the admiralty rule of divided
damages.
'E. g., Owners of The Farmer v. McCraw, 26 Ala. x89 (1855).
s E. g., Fisher v. Luling, 33 N. Y. Superior Ct. Rep. 137 (1871). Some
states continued to enforce process in rem as to transactions on the Great
Lakes, claiming the right to do so under the Act of 1845 (5 Stat. at L. 726) :
Horn v. The Sch. Trial, 22 NVIs. 529 (1868); Tugboat E. P. Dorr v. Waldron,
6z Ill 221 (1871). Cf. also Dongan v. The Champlain Transp. Co., 6 Lans.
430 (1872). See The Eagle, 8 Wall. xs, 25 (1868). The Act of 1845 was
not included in Rev. Stats., only its provision as to jury trial, Sec. 566, being
retained.
" Taylor v. Steamer Columbia, 5 Cal. 268 (1855); Averill v. Steamer
Hartford, 2 Cal. 3o8 -(1852) ; Meiggs v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 405 (1857) ; Warner
v. The Uncle Sam, 9 Cal. 697 (1858); Ord v. The Uncle Sam, 13 Cal.
369 (1859).
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Taylor and The Hine v. Trevor struck at this budding jurispru-
dence and at assertions such as these. For the first time there was
a serious conflict between federal and state atuthority over the
corpus of maritime law. The sharpest issue at this time and the
one calling for immediate settlement related to the power of the
states to seize vessels and to enforce liens of their own creation by
proceedings in rem. This issue was presented and decided in
favor of federal authority. Other problems remained, of which
that presented in the Jensen case was one. The Moses Taylor
was but the first step in a continuous development. The court
went no further than was necessary at the time, but it did decide
this first great question in such a way as to unify federal admi-
ralty jurisdiction, and to a large extent, the law to be applied in a
matter as to which the states, each for itself, were then claim-
ing an equal power-a claim which if sustained would result in
great diversity in the law applicable to those engaged in mari-
time transactions. Whether or not the hand of the court was
forced by a true or misconceived historical condition, the fact
remains.
It must be conceded, however, that the Supreme Court did
not go so far as it might have gone in the protection extended to
the federal maritime law,--or rather, at least as against diversity
of state law, to those engaged in maritime transactions. Nine
years before The Moses Taylor, it had been held that process is-
suing from state courts, even in their exercise of concurrent juris-
diction over maritime matters, might run against property sub-
ject to a maritime lien, and that so long as such property was in
the possession of state officers, the marshal might not seize it on
admiralty process. 27 The court was careful to state that a sale
following such seizure by the state did not by its own force dis-
place the maritime lien, and this has ever since been regarded as
"Taylor v. Caryl, 2o How. 583 (1857). See, also, recognizing the state's
power to enforce attachment and levies of execution in the exercise of its con-
current jurisdiction: Leon v. Galceron, ii Wall. 185 (8"o); Pennywit v.
Eaton, is Wall. 382 (x872-; Johnson v. Chic. & Pac. EL Co., ui9 U. S.
388 (1886); Norton v. Switzer, 93 U. S. 35s (1876).
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settled.2 8 Even so, there is a substantial impairment in the ef-
fectiveness of the admiralty proceeding, because of the delay
which a seizure by state officers imposes upon the would-be libel-
ant claiming a lien.
Let us recall for a moment the reasoning of Justice Field in
The Moses Taylor. He seems to have believed that under the
Constitution federal jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime
matters was exclusive, and that the states could acquire concur-
rent jurisdiction, if at all, only under an act of Congress. In the
'case in question, however, the result is justified by reasoning that
is opposed. Justice Campbell certainly believed that nothing in
the Constitution led to the view that such concurrent jurisdiction
was a matter of grace, but that it existed under that instrument
itself. Discrepancies such as this cause despair of finding in
the opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Court any final an-
swer to the enigma of uniformity. When they believe it desirable
to limit the extent of admiralty jurisdiction or the applicability
of admiralty law, they find that limitation in. reasoning A; when
they wish to extend the one or the opaer, they resort to reason-
ing B. What matter that reasoning B in the first case or reason-
ing A in the second would lead to quite opposite conclusions!
As has been shown above, such a conflict between reasoning
A and reasoning B runs through many of the cases relating one
way or the other to the theory of uniformity. It is manifest par-
ticularly in those that interpret the saving clause in the judiciary
Act of 1789.29 Not only are there interpretations A and B, but
"Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256 (i894). May a state, in an action
based upon a nonmaritime transaction, enforce against a vessel a statute
which authorizes proceedings in ren in Justice Field's sense? To admit as
much would interfere with maritime liens in admiralty courts, less often,
perhaps, but quite as effectively as though states were permitted to enforce
maritime liens in rem. The Supreme Court has never finally settled this
question. There are conflicting dicta. That the state court may so do, see:
Knapl Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 171 U. S. 638 (sgoo); The Belfast, 7 Wall.
624, 636 (868); The Robert IV. Parsons, 19! U. S. 17, 259 (1903). That it
may not, see Moran v. Sturges, supra. As supporting this last view, see also
The Elexena, 53 Fed. 359 (Dist. Ct., E. D. Va., 1892). The question was
left open in The Winnebago, 205 U. S. 354 (1897).
" Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, Sec. 9, z Star. at L 73, 77; Jud. Code;
Sec. 24.
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interpretations C, D, E, etc., as well. That of Justice Field has
already been referred to. 30  Apparently, According to him, the
saving clause was at best a grant of concurrent jurisdiction to
the states by the federal government. It did not save but gave,
and all it gave was "a common law remedy," meaning by that
phrase not such new forms of proceeding as the states might in-
vent, but such forms of proceeding as were known of old at
common law. According to Justice Camnpbell, s l however, the
saving clause, so to speak, saved nothing, because the states al-
ready had a power at least as extensive as this, and since the
Constitution did not take it away, Congress could not give it
back. Others have gone further in this direction, finding in the
caving clause a contemporaneous interpretation of the Constitu-
tion to the effect that except as to one institution, proceedings to
enforce a maritime lien, the states had not only concurrent juris-
diction but power to apply whatever law they wished in the
exercise thereof. 32 Early cases so interpreted it without the limita-
tions as to the maritime lien.-" Others have found init a saving
of a remedy more extensive than that given at common law,
though in the case in question merely in aid of an imperfect
remedy already existing.3' Others have argued that all it saved
was a right to proceed in other federal courts under the diversity
'See p. 229. Cf., also, The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 642, 644 (1868), Justice
Clifford; Moran v. Sturges, i54 U. S. 256 (i844), Chief Justice Fuller; The
Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555 (1866), Justice Miller; Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917), Justice McReynolds.
' Taylor v. Caryl, 2o How. 583 (1857). Cf. also New Jersey S. N. Co.
v. Merchants Bank, 6 How. 344, 390 0848), Justice Nelson; Waring v.
Clark, s How. 441 (1847), Justice Wayne, perhaps the first interpretation
of that clause in the Supreme Court, if not in any reported case. One may
deduce from this theory that since the Constitution did not intend the states
to stand still, they may create such new remedies as they see fit: Johnson v.
Westerfield's Adm'r, 143 Ky. 1o (1gI).
raThe Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 (19o7), Justice Holmes. One may
deduce from this theory that the states may create not only such new
remedies but such new substantive law as they see fit, subject only to the
exception of the proceeding in rein and perhaps to control by Congress act-
ing under a proper authority. See also Cashmere v. De Wolf, 2 Sandf. (N.
Y.) 379 (1849); Baird v. Daly, 57 N. Y. 236 (1874).
3Cf. Reynolds v. The Favorite, io Minn. 242 (1865); Thompson v.
SS. Julius D. Morton, 2 Ohio S. 26 (1853).
"Knapp Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 171 U. S. 638 (igoo), Justice Brown.
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clause.3 5 Nor is this all,36 nor does it include the innumerable
cases where a state court was held to have or not to have power
to do a particular thing, and the saving clause was cited as
authority and not otherwise interpreted. In the face of so many
inconsistent interpretations, as in all cases where reasoning A is
resorted to for the purpose of justifying one series of results and
contradictory reasoning B for the purpose of justifying another,
one seeking to find out what the law is, is justified in disregarding
reasonings A and B both,-that is, in the present instance, the
diverse interpretations of the saving clause-and in concentrating
his attention upon the actual point decided. Nor can he be ac-
cused of not playing the game in so doing, since both or all the
contradictory sets of reasoning are entitled to equal credit or dis-
credit, unless it be the last one uttered. I confess that this is
very nearly a cry of despair. At the risk of seeming to shirk
responsibilities assumed in writing these articles, I shall say no
more about the saving clause.
The many problems of our maritime law in relation to the
doctrine of uniformity discussed in these articles, all have a
common feature: what rules are to be applied by whatever court
exercises jurisdiction over a maritime transaction. We have
seen how the admiralty courts took or held to themselves ex-
clusive jurisdiction of proceedings to enforce the maritime lien,
and in a previous article how the jurisdiction thus taken or held
resulted in uniformity of the law to be applied except as to the
lien for materials, repairs, supplies or other necessaries furnished
to a vessel in her home port.w Through exclusiveness of juris-
diction, in other words, uniformity of a sort was accomplished.
There remains for consideration the problem of the law that is
to be applied in other transactions of a maritime nature. So far
as our courts or legislatures have consciously striven to make
this law uniform, we find recognition of the doctrine
' Frederick Bausman, 36 Am. LAW RE:v. 84, 187.
"The above categories are necessarily procrustean, for exactly what the
various learned judges meant is not always clear.
"73 U. of PA. L. R-v. z4o.
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of uniformity, whether or not they use these terms. So
far as they have permitted it to be diverse, however, while they
have assailed the doctrine of uniformity so far as absolute uni-
versal uniformity is concerned, they have not necessarily repu-
diated it in its application to those situations where the law ought
to be uniform. As previously stated the field of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, as such jurisdiction has developed in the
United States, extends to matters as to which uniformity is not
necessarily desirable,-may be quite undesirable in fact.' 8 Dis-
cussion of the matters in which it is or is not desirable, whether
or not within the field of admiralty jurisdiction as at present de-
limited, must wait for treatment in subsequent articles. For my
present purpose, however,-how far the doctrine of uniformity
has been recognized in our law-it may be assumed that in ordi-
nary maritime case uniformity is desirable. Therefore so far as
our courts or legislatures have permitted the law applicable in
such cases to be diverse, it will be assumed that they have struck
a blow at the doctrine of uniformity.
The problems that next present themselves therefore are
those concerned with the law to be applied to maritime trans-
actions, first, by the federal admiralty courts in the exercise of
their jurisdiction, second by the state courts in the exercise of
theirs.
The attitude of our early federal judges towards the law they
were to apply has already been mentioned. 39 They followed the
law of the sea, gathering that law from many sources, continental
and English, ancient and modern. Differences between the Dis-
trict Courts were settled by the ultimate court of appeal-the
Supreme Court. So iar, then, the system was one that necessar-
ily resulted in uniformity throughout our own admiralty courts.
There were, however, certain tendencies towards diversity. One
of these, the application by the admiralty courts of state statutes
creating liens for necessaries furnished vessels in their home ports,
has already been discussed. Another was the predilection of our
'See, also, 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 19o.
0073 U. OF PA. L. REv. 127, 12, 131.
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admiralty judges for the decided case. No doubt the doctrines
of stare decisis worked for uniformity in the sense above men-
tioned, but it also works against uniformity of maritime law as
an international system.40 As precedents multiplied we neces-
sarily individualized our own law, the general maritime law so
far as it existed became less effective, and the door to international
uniformity by way of jurisprudence (in the continental sense)
was more and more blocked. Discussion of the proper function
of the doctrines of stare decisis in admiralty law or in commer-
cial law generally lies outside the scope of this article; but grant-
ing for a moment the desirability of uniformity in its widest ap-
plication, in passing we cannot but question the unconsidered ap-
plication to maritime cases of common law rules as to the binding
force of precedents. If the maritime law of one nation is to be
attuned to that of the rest of the world, a very different rule
might well be applied. Another factor tending towards diversity
in the admiralty courts is the lack of any clear rule fixing the line
between matters of local concern properly subject to local regu-
lation and matters where the local rule should not prevail. The
line between jurisdiction and no jurisdiction might well have been
the same line, but as has been shown, the first line, at least in tort
cases, was drawn with no well-considered reasoning why it should
be where it was placed rather than somewhere else.41  With re-
gard to this last factor, the situation, of course, became more
acute as state legislation and regulation developed.
*Cf. W. S. Holdsworth, r Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal His-
tory 320. Justice Bradley, in The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 571 (1874), said:
"If . . . with the new lights that have been thrown upon the whole sub-
ject of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction, a more rational view of the
question demands an adverse ruling in order to preserve harmony and logical
consistency in the general system, the court might, perhaps, if no evil con-
sequences of a glaring character were likely to ensue, feel constrained
to adopt it" [an argument that The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438 (18iq),
should be overruled]. But the court declined to exercise this power be-
cause, in effect, the rule in question had been rcognized by the commercial
community as a rule of property and large sums invested in vessels on the
theory of that case.
a73 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 139. See the strictures of Justice Holmes stated
in note 94.
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Nevertheless, with one important exception soon to be men-
tioned, the maritime law was uniform in ihe great majority of its
apjplications, at least throughout the United States, and those ap-
plications where it was not uniform were generally matters of
local concern.42  The case of Workman. v. Neu, York,43 which
fixed the principle of uniformity at least as to maritime law in ad-
miralty courts, came late, it is true, but it established no rule of
law different from what had existed in practice.
Even earlier, the Supreme Court had decided that Congress
had a legislative power applicable to all matters within the field of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction without resort to the com-
merce clause, the field of which was not necessarily coterminous.44
'E. g., Local rules of navigation: The New York Central No. x8 257
Fed. 405 (Cir. Ct. App., 2d Circ., 1919); Pilotage: Ex p. McNiel, 13 Wall.
236 (1871); Ex p. Hagar, 104 U. S. 20 (188i); Ferries: Cf. Wiggin's Ferry
Co. v. City of East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365 (1882); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 12 How. 299 (185x)" Fisheries: Cf. Manchester v. Massachusetts,
139 Mass. 240 (xg9i); Structures in and titles to land under navigable
waters: Cf. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324 (1876); Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, 3 How. 212, 230 (1845). For other instances, see case collected in
The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed. 98, io6. In many of these and similar cases the
recognition of the state's power is not based on the fact that the matter regu-
lated was local, but on considerations that would apply equally to non-local
exercises. So far, therefore, these cases may be properly cited as sembles
against the doctrine of uniformity in maritime matters. In The City of Nor-
walk, however, they are explained as falling within the State's power because
local, and this has been the later tendency.
See also J. D. Grace, 55 Am. L, REv. 641, 663, for the injurious effect
on uniformity of a reduction in the appeals effectively taken from the Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals to the Supreme Court, and for a suggested cure.
*Workman v. New York. etc., 179 U. S. 552 (90o). See also United
Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U. S. 3o8 (1918).
"In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1 089i); Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264
U. S. 375 (1924) ; Butler v. Boston and Savannah SS. Co., z3o U. S. 527, 556
0888); Janney v. Columbia Ins. Co., io Wheat. 411, 418 (1825). Many
acts of Congress relating to maritime matters have often been held consti-
tutional under the commerce power, without reference to the power in ques-
tion which if existent was quite sufficient, e. g., Moore v. Am. Transp. Co.,
24 How. 137 (x86o). Is it not possible that the framers considered the
commerce power as extending to all matters within the jurisdictional grant?
[But see Justice Bradley, The Lottaamnna, 21 Wall. 558, 577 (I84).]
If so it was not necessary to give Congress specifically a power to legislate
with regard to such matters. But without realization of this appositeness, con-
struction of the commerce power went one way and of the jurisdictional
grant another, so that matters came into the domain of the latter without
being within the former. It is quite as proper to impute to the framers
logical consistency as it is to impute to them an intent to have jurisdiction be
what it later became, and to have the commerce power be what it was
later construed to be, and to infer from the existence of the hiatus between
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Such a result could only have been reached on the theory that
there was a federal admiralty law, as the Workman case subse-
quently made clear.
There is, however, a class of cases which does not readily
fall within these principles.
The growing belief in the unfairness of the common law rule
that denied an action to the estate of a man killed by the fault of
another or to those injuriously affected by his death manifested
itself in connection with maritime as well as non-maritime trans-
actions. The states set about remedying this evil by statutes which
were quite naturally diverse in character. The admiralty courts,
in tentative fashion having no federal statute to go upon, reached
various conclusions on different grounds, all of which clearly ap-
pears in the exhaustive opinion of Chief Justice Waite in The
Harrisburg." Some of them followed local state statutes; others,
either because none were yet at hand or because they did not for
various reasons believe they should follow them, reached different
conclusions on different grounds as to the existence of the right
to bring such actions in admiralty. Finally the question came to
the Supreme Court, and the law to be applied by the admiralty
courts was certainly made uniform in the narrow sense of na-
tional uniformity, but to put it mildly, that law was set at vari-
ance with the law applicable to such maritime deaths in most other
civilized countries.4" In this last respect, what might be termed a
"second best" uniformity was later accomplished in a curious way.
The lower admiralty courts seized upon local death statutes and
applied them, and the Supreme Court finally sanctioned this prac-
tice.47 In general, an action for causing death could be brought.
the two, that the framers intended Congress to have no legislative power as
to matters falling therein, and therefore the states to have it. The problem
presented in In re Garnett was as to a matter within the hiatus. Assuming
that the jurisdictional grant had been properly construed, and not desiring
to broaden the commerce power as it had developed, the Court could reach
no other conclusion if admiralty law as to such matters was to be uniform.
" The Harrisburg, ix9 U. S. 9gg (1886)."
"The Harrisburg, iig U. S. 199 ('886). As to foreign law, see Hughes
Adm., 2d ed., 222 etseq., 34 Rav. NT. DE DROIT MAI. 8o6; cf. 38 HARV. L
REV. 499.
" Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (1921).
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So far the law tended toward international and interstate uniform-
ity. In details these local statutes, the only basis for recovery, dif-
fered. and to the extent that they differed the law was diverse.
At the risk of being caught in a trap of my own setting,
48
however, I venture to suggest that the whole history of this mat-
ter is so peculiar, and the failure of the Supreme Court in The
Harrisburg to give effect to the prevailing international view so
striking-a view consistent with the ideal of uniformity-that one
is not justified in deducing a general rule therefrom. Further-
more, the jurisdictional basis of the state death statutes is nearly
always territorial. 49 In a sense, therefore, they are local, and their
applicability to maritime transactions may superficially be ex-
plained on the same ground that the application of local lien acts
has been explained." Perhaps it is enough that they have been so
explained.' Such an explanation. however, is obviously false, for
a local and differentiated state statute having a territorial applica-
tion may affect the very person or ship it ought not to affect if the
law is to be uniform in its intersectional or international relations,
"See comments on the practice of regarding unfavorable matters as
based upon exceptional considerations at the opening of this article. See
also 37 HARv. L. REv. 111, r117, n. 23, where the learned author, according
to the fashion so popular nowadays, finds the explanation for the difference
between the applicability of state death acts and the non-applicability of
state compensation acts in judicial prejudice in favor of one and against
the other.
"The state statutes often so provide: Cf.. McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N.
Y. 546 (i8--). Such statutes, however, may be made applicable to deaths
upon or due to acts of those in charge of domestic vessels or even to
deaths caused by citizens: ,Cf. The Hanuiton, 207 U. S. 3o8 (i9o7).
The predilection of construction, however, seems to favor a territorial
basis, either actual or "constructive." as in the case of a domestic vessel
outside territorial limits: see The Middlesex, 253 Fed. 142 (Dist. Ct., Mass.,
i916) and comment thereon, 32 HARV. L. REv. 713; Fisher v. Boutelle Transp.
Co.. 162 Fed. 994 (Dist. Ct.. E. D. Pa., i9o6, 19o8).
"Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (921).
"On the theory that by common opinion actions for death, however gen-
erally they may be allowed, are matters for local regulation: Hughes, Adm.,
2d ed., 226; G. Philip Wardner. 21 HARV. L. Rv. 75. Even so, as Mr. Hughes
points out, they are maritime in nature. The mere fact that foreign methods
of enforcement do not necessitate or permit an action in their' "admiralty"
courts does not oust our admiralty courts of jurisdiction or make the rule
to be applied any the less part of our admiralty law: Pouppirt v. Elder
Dempster S. Co., xz2 Fed. 982 (Dist. Ct., E. D. ra, z9o3).
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-the foreign ship or person temporarily within the territory.52
The only answer to this is that uniformity is better served by hav-
ing some death statute applicable than by having none.
The next problem is that relating to the law which state
courts may apply in the exercise of their concurrent jurisdiction
of maritime matters, excluding of course state attempts to enforce
maritime liens by proceedings in ren already discussed. The con-
current jurisdiction will be conceded, although perhaps it is not
irrelevant to remark again that the Constitution does not neces-
sarily lead to the conclusion that the states were to have any con-
current jurisdiction, that though the saving clause in the judiciary
Act of 1789 did purport to save something to the states, it is not
very clear what it meant to save, nor that it may rightly be re-
garded as a contemporaneous interpretation of the Constitution,
nor even that, strictly speaking, it was constitutional at all.58
Whatever the truth may be, the states did exercise a concurrent
jurisdiction as to matters which then undoubtedly were regarded
as within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, and as to many others
which, whatever the doubts then, later came to be so regarded.
Like Topsy this concurrent jurisdiction jut grew, and grew with-
out any conscious effort to correlate its exercise to the new federal
scheme of things. Certainly in this early period it was not directly
based on the saving clause, so far as the reports in reported.cases
go.
The jurisdiction was exercised in fact, and widely exercised,
and as to its basis, constitutional or otherwise little can be deduced.
from the cases. 54 It seems not unlikely, however, that the ex-
planation is not so much legal as practical. The state admirAlty
ME. g., Aurora Shipping Co. v. Boyce, 191 Fed. 96o (Cir. Ct. App,
9th Circ., 191) ; Oregon law giving a lien was applied in an admiralty court
to a ship, owned by a California corporation, and having her home port
there, on which a death had occurred in Oregon waters.
See supra, and also 73 U. oF PA. L. REv. 132, 129.
' In 9 Johns. (N. Y., 1812) are twelve cases which could have been
brought in admiralty as rules of jurisdiction now are; in 2 Yeates (Penn.,
1707-1798) 4; in i5 Mass. (1818-19) 7; in 3 H. & J. (Md., 1810-13) 3. These
volumes were selected at random. Many are actions on policies of insur-
ance, but there are actions by seamen for wages or improper treatment, by
shippers for loss of goods, and by a passenger for breach of contract of
carriage.
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courts, for what they were worth. had gone. The federal admi-
ralty courts were new and untried. The practitioner was not in-
clincd to experiment with them as yet. He was not sure what was
and what was not maritime, and he brought his case, whether
maritime or not by their standard, before the state court, which
was known to him from a period antedating the Constitution. The
defendant's counsel suffered the jurisdiction to attach. It never
occurred to either to ascertain what the new federal government,
still tentatively feeling its way, had to say on the question, and if
questions of jurisdiction occurred to any one's mind, counsel and
court may well have been influenced by current English theories
as to that subject, although as has been shown, English limitations
on admiralty jurisdiction were not to be a part of our law.
This, then, was the actual situation and it was no dbubt a
situation that eventually led to the subsequent conflicts between
the state and the federal admiralty courts both as to'jurisdiction
and as to law. But at that time it did not result in any appreciable
or objectionable non-uniformity of law, because the common law
of the states was under the influence of Lord Mansfield's com-
mercialization of the common law, a commercialization which in-
cluded the incorporation of much of the maritinie law merchant
into the common law; 5' and it was particularly in mercantile mat-
ters that this jurisdiction of the state courts was exercised. Fur-
thermore, the conception that the maritime law was part of the
jus gcntium, 50 that such law was obligatory on the state courts,
and that classical authorities and codes were the evidence as to its
uHoldsworth, 2 Select Essays 315-20; Chandler v. Grieves, 2 H. BI. 6o6
n. (1791-2). Cf. Conrad v. De Montcourt, 138 Mo. 311 (1897); 2 Select
Pleas Admiralty (ii Selden Soc.) lxxx. The influence of Lord Mansfield on
our law appears in the following maritime cases, chosen more or less at
random: Insurance, Clarkson v. Phenix Ins. Co.. 9 Johns. r (r812); Hood
v. McMurtrie. i Yeates 114 (1792) ; Thurston v. Koch, 2 DalU. 348 (Cir. Ct.,
Pa., x8oo); carriage of goods, Reynolds v. Toppan, 15 Mass. 370 (x8g9);
Penoyer v. Hallett, 15 Johns. 331 (1818); appurtenances of a vessel, Rich-
ardson v. Clark, i5 Me. 421 (1838).
'Cf. Nimicl . Holmes, 25 Pa. 366, 371 (1855)': Copeland.v. N. E. M.
I. Co., 2 Met. 432, 445 (1841); Boyce v. Moore, 2 Dall. i96 (Pa., 1793);
Vasse v. Ball, 2 Yeates 178, 182 (Pa., 1797); Ludlow v. Union Ins. Co., 2
S. & R. 119, 125 (Pa., z815); Smith v. Gilbert, 4 Day roS (z8o7); Chase v.
Alliance Ins. Co., 9 Allen 311 (1864).
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content, seems to have been accepted by the state courts as it was
in the federal courts.57 Ip short, we find the state courts applying
the same law that the federal courts applied; in other words much
the same condition" existed in practice that the Jensen case and its
successor have declared must exist as a matter of law.
In the exercise of jurisdiction over these matters, however,
the decisions in the various states tended to diverge from the uni-
formity of law with which they began. An insurance problem
would be decided in New York and another similar one in Massa-
chusetts, each decision being based on the common body of law
referred to. The next case in these jurisdictions would, however,
be decided with reference to the precedent so established, and thus
they would work away from the common source.58 The report-
ing of decisions played its part. The rule of stare decisis was
given the same application and emphasis that it received in mat-
ters of purely local concern. After all they were state courts with-
out obligations to each other. The judges in the states can scarcely
be blamed for following old habits when in many matters they can
scarcely have known they were exercising a concurrent jurisdic-
tion, the standards for determining admiralty's cognizance of
these matters not yet having been developed.
At all events, while the admiralty courts were still mainly en-
grossed with questions as to what their jurisdiction was, the states
were developing more or less diverse systems of substantive law
of their own as to maritime matters. On the other -hand trade
situations were simpler, legislation and regulation much less ex-
tensive, and the extent and results of such diversity correspond-
ingly less than they would be today if.the condition had remained
uncontrolled. Such control came to some extent from what might
be called an intensification of admiralty jurisdiction. Suitors for
various reasons sought the admiralty courts where formerly they
"Ward v. Ames, 9 Johns. 138 "(1812); Broadhurst v. CoL Ins. Co.,;9
Johns. 9 (1812); Fuller v. McCall, 2 Dall. 219 (Pa.; 1795);. Camberling k.
McCall, 2 Dall. 28o (Pa:, 1798); Appleton v. Crowninshield, 3 Mass. 443
(i8o7); Donnell v. Columbian Ins. Cb., Sumn. 366 (Cir. Ct., Mass.,) at law,
1836); Richardson v. Clark, r5 Me. 42t (1838).
"Cf. Coolidge v. Glouc. Mar. Ins. Co, 1s Mass. 34o (i8s9); Marine Ins.
Co. of N. Y. v. Un. Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 186 (i8sz).
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had gone to those of the states. The result was the growth of
substantive admiralty law, and this the states tended to follow. 59
\Vithout examination of every case in all the states, the ez:act
extent of this diversity cannot be ascertained. This would be a
hopeless task, for innumerable cases really maritime in nature lie
buried in digests, encyclopaedias and text books among similar
non-maritime cases. No one has ever separated them, and perhaps
it would not be worth while ever to do so. There are, however,
certain situations where for one reason or another the existence of
such diversity becomes apparent, and some of these will now be
considered.
We have seen how the admiralty courts applied local death
acts. The question arises, whether the states in the exercise of
their concurrent jurisdiction may also do so. It should be borne
in mind that to permit them to do so resulted in no greater diver-
sity than that which admiralty law, rightly or wrongly, had al-
ready sanctioned. A general argument, based on this particular
power in the states, to the effect that they may always (or until
Congress has declared otherwise under an appropriate power) ap-
ply any law they please is necessarily much weakened. Moreover,
actual authority upon the existence and extent of this power in
the states is scanty. Their right to apply their own death act was
contested in the Supreme Court shortly after and upon similar
reasoning to that successful in The Moses Taylor and The Hine
-v. Trevor, and the power was recognized.60 When this case was
decided, however, it was not yet settled that the admiralty law was
opposed to that laid down in the state statute,-though the court
seems to assume that it might be so. Had the admiralty rule
turned out to be the same (in which case there would have been
no diversity of law), who would have said that this case contained
E. g., Scarfe v. Metcalf, i07 N. Y. 211 (1887); Baker v. Lewis, 33
Pa. 301 (1858); Kalleck v. Deering, 161 Mass. 469 (t894), Holmes, J.;
Conrod v. De Montcourt, 138 Mo. 311 (1897). For an instance where the
state adopted the divided damage rule by statute: Stewart v. Henry, 3 Bush
438 (1867). In some cases the court followed some admiralty rules and not
others: Union SS. Co. v. Nottingham, 17 Gratt. XIS (x866).
"Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522 (1872). See also Sherlock v.
Ailing, 93 U. S. 99 (1876).
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more than a mere dichn or senible as to the power of the state to
enforce its own law? It contains no less a semble or dictum be-
cause the admiralty law did turn out to be divergent. Nor seem-
ingly has this question been brought directly before the Supreme
Court after it had been determined what the federal maritime law
was. The right of the state to apply its own death act in its own
courts is, of course, of minor importance, if in the application of
that act whether in state or admiralty court all the -current state
jurisprudence as to contributory negligence, the fellow servant
rule, assumption of risk, etc., goes with it. Such has been the
weight of authority,61 but there has been a decision the other way
as to the application of this jurisprudence in the admiralty
courts. 62 If this is right and if the state court is permitted to
exercise a concurrent jurisdiction, diversity is added to diversity.
If it is wrong, diversity to some extent disappears.
Apart from this instance of uniformity in diversity, cases are
singularly few where the Supreme Court has sanctioned the appli-
cation by state courts of their own lav in the exercise of their con-
current jurisdiction. Opponents of the doctrine of uniformity
naturally reason from this that the rule was so well established
that it went without saying. This they also declare was the tra-
ditional view of the admiralty courts. s In the face of such a
statement by men so qualified to judge, it would be presumptuous
to say the contrary. Undoubtedly it was the tradition. But one
is permitted to assert that as such it marks a departure from the
still earlier tradition of uniformity in such matters, and that the
legal foundation for it in the Supreme Court is slight. The cases
cited are these: The Steamboat New York v. Rea: 6 4 The owner
of a brig brought a libel in rem against a steamboat for damages
done to the brig by a collision. The steamboat was found to be
in fault; and the brig to be guiltless. It was argued, however,
that though the brig complied with the federal rule as to her lights,
she did not comply with the rule prescribed by a New York stat-
' See authorities collected in 73 U. oF PA. L. Rt. 2ot.
The Devona, .s Fed. (2d) 482 (Dist. Ct., Me., 1924).
E. g., Judge Charles M. Hough, 37 HARV. L REV. 529, 538 et seq.
iSz How. 223 (0855).
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ute, not inconsistent with the federal rule but requiring the light
to be carried at a higher elevation. Justice Nelson saidi "This
is a rule of navigation prescribed by the laws of New York, and
is doubtless binding upon her own courts." He then held that
failure to comply with it did not in the admiralty court show fault
on the part of the brig. Atlee v. Packet Co.: 15 The owner of a
barge libelled the owner of a pier for loss of the barge due to a
collision with the pier. Both were found to be in fault. The Su-
preme Court reinstated a decree of the District Court with this
finding, decreeing division of damages. Miller, J., said: "In the
common law court the defendant must pay all the damage or
none." The Atlas: 6  This was a similar case, and a similar dic-
tum was uttered by Clifford, J.
Quebec S. S. Co. v. Merchant: 67 A stewardess brought an
action in the state court for personal injury through falling over-
board because of the condition of the railing due to the negligence
of one or the other of two members of the crew. The action'was
removed to the Circuit Court because of diversity of citizenship.
Plaintiff had a verdict. It was held in the Supreme Court that it
was error to refuse to direct a verdict for the defendant, because
each of the two whose negligence might have caused the injury
was a fellow servant of the plaintiff. Assuming that the stewardess
was a seaman, she was undoubtedly injured in the service of the
ship (she was emptying slops at the time). As the admiralty law
is now, she would undoubtedly have recovered for care and cure
and possibly for maintenance.6 8 But at the time this case was
decided, the admiralty law even in the case of seamen was flirting
"21 Wall. 389 (1874). Some state cases that seem to apply this dictum
were decided without thought that the jurisdiction was concurrent, admiralty
jurisdiction as to the locality not yet being established: Baker v. Lewis, 33
Pa. 301 (1858); Broadwell v. Wigert, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 39 (I846); Owners
of The Farmer v. McCraw, 26 Ala. 189 (z855). They are not authority that
the rule to be applied at common law is contrary to the admiralty rule when
concurrent jurisdiction is being exercised.
"93 U. S. 302 (1876).
133 U. S. 375 (18-o).
"The Osceola, 189 U. S. xs8 (9o3) ; Chelentis v. Luckdnbach SS. Co.,
247 U. S. 372, 384 (1918).
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with the fellow servant rule. 09 It is not evident that the same re-
suilt might not have been reached in admiralty. The rule stated by
the court is not stated as a peculiarly common law rule.
Belden v. Chase:70 An action at law was brought in a state
court for loss of plaintiff's boat due to a collision with defendant's.
Plaintiff had a verdict for the full value of his boat, interest and
costs. The question of negligence on both sides turned partly on
how far the two boats had complied with the federal rules of the
road. Because the construction of these was involved, the Supreme
Court held that it had jurisdiction under a writ of error, Chief
Justice Fuller saying that it was of vital importance that these
rules should be interpreted and enforced in the same sense by state
courts that they are by federal admiralty courts. He also stated
that in order to maintain the action the plaintiff must establish
that defendant's negligence was the sole cause of the accident, and
that plaintiff could not recover, although defendant were negli-
gent, if plaintiff were also negligent and such negligence contribu-
ted to the accident. He cited as authority Atlee v. The Packet
Co. Because instructions requested by the defendant, which if
given and believed to be true would have made it proper for the
jury to find the plaintiff negligent, were not given, the judgment
was reversed. The remarks of Chief Justice Fuller as to the effect
of contributory negligence are of course only a dictum, for the
case would have had to be sent back for a new trial, whether the
divided damage rule were to be applied or not, the plaintiff having
recovered in full for the loss of his boat.
It will be noticed that these cases, with but one possible ex-
ception, contain dicta only on the point in question, and are, with-
out any exception,"1 cases where the state rule was, generally
"Frederick Cunningham, x8 HARv. L REv. 294; Fitz-Henry Smith, Jr.,
19 HAnv. L Rxv. 418, 42o. But see The Osceola, x89 U. S. i58, 175 (1923);
Justice Brown's third point.
" i5o U. S. 674 (1893). But cf., Germaine v. Albina Mar. I. W., 1923
A. M. C. 303 (Dist. Ct., Ore., x922); Duggins v. Watson, 15 Ark. 118 (1854).
' It is quite possible that research might bring to light other cases in the
Supreme Court, where in a maritime transaction state law adverse to the
defendant was in fact applied, as, for example, in a case involving a policy
of marine insurance, on appeal from a lower federal court where jurisdiction
was taken because of diversity of citizenship, and the sole question was
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speaking, more favorable to the defendant than the rule that
would have been applied in admiralty; for ordinarily a defend-
ant, sued for damage duc to a collision between his vessel
and that of the plaintiff, would prefer the application of a
rule by which the plaintiff if guilty of contributory fault would
lose entirely rather than a rule, by which he would recover.
half damages ;7 - and similarly, a ship owner sued by an in-
jured seaman would prefer the application of a rule by which
he would be excused entirely if found free from fault 53 In cases
of concurrent jurisdiction, it is the plaintiff who chooses the
forum. The defendant cannot oppose his choice, but must de-
fend in the court where he has been called. Justice Miller, in
.4tlee v. Packet Co., said in explanation of the dictum he had ut-
tered: "The plaintiff who has the selection of the forum in
which he will litigate cannot complain of the rule of that for-
um." It In other words the plaintiff having chosen the common
law forum may not complain of the application of its law unfavor-
able to him. It is a very different thing to say that the defendant,
who did not chose to be in that court, may not complain of state
law which lie believes unfavorable to him. Conceding that he might
have so complained, in none of these cases did he so complain.
Apparently, therefore, the Supreme Court was not called upon to
one of substantive law. Most of the maritime cases likely to find their way
to the Supreme Court in this manner (but not all) are commercial cases
governed by the rule of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), the doctrine of
which in such applications co-operate, so to speak, with the doctrine of uni-
formity discussed in these articles: Cf., Washburn and Moan Mfg. Co. v.
Reliance Mar. Ins. Co.. i79 U. S. i (9oo).
Conceivably a defendant, who believed himself more or less unpopular
with the jury, might prefer to have the opportunity for compromise latent
in the admiralty rule presented to them.
'Conceivably, again, if the evidence were conflicting as to whether
the fault was that of a fellow-servant or of the defendant himself or for
which he was legally accountable at common law, he might prefer the certain
but less extensive liability of the admiralty law.
1421 Wall. 389, 395 (1874). See also Sawyer v. Eastern S. B. Co., 46
Me. 400 (1859). An argument that a libellant for contribution as a joint
tort-feasor in a maritime collision, he having been sued at common law by
the third party injured therein and having paid the judgment, could not
complain of the consequences of such common law judgment at common law
(his sole liability without right of contribution) did not meet with favor
in The Ira 3L Hedges, 218 U. S. 264 (ixgio).
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decide this question until the Jensen case.-- They then decided in
favor of the defendant's contention,-that he, in the state court
without choice, might now choose to have the maritime law ap-
plied. In other words, except for the doubtful precedent of the
death act cases, the Jensen case was one of first impression in the
Supreme Court, not merely because the application of a workmen's
compensation act was involved, but because it was the first case
where the plaintiff was seeking to force on an unwilling defendant
a rule of the state court unfavorable to that defendant and com-
plained of by him. Of course this question had arisen in the state
courts, and state law unfavorable to the defendant had been ap-
plied over his objection,76 but as often, though in somewhat dif-
ferent situations, the problem was the same as that presented to
the Supreme Court before the Jensen case.77
Always with the reservation that its minor premise may be
unsound-that granting the doctrine of uniformity, it -should not
necessarily be so applied as to override local workmen's compen-
sation acts at least in some cases,-the Jenseit case falls into line.
It was a new step so far as concerns the announcement of its major.
premise in relation to the state's power to enforce its own law in
the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, but except upon deductions
244 U. S. 205 (197).
"Collision, that admiralty rule of presumption of fault from breach of
rules does not apply to plaintiff: Union SS. Co. v. Nottingham, 17 Gratt. 1i5
(1866), dictum; Sawyer v. Eastern S. B. Co., 46 Me. 4oo (1859). Partition:
Andrews v. Betts, 8 Hun 322 (i876) ; but cf. Fischer v. Carey, 173 Cal. x85
(igi6), and distinguish cases that gave relief on ground that admiralty
could not: Reynolds v. Nielsen, 1x6 Wis. 483 (i9o3); Swain v. Knapp, 32
Minn. 429 (1884). Marine insurance: Thwing v. Great Western Ins. Co., iii
Mass. 93 (1872), but cf., Chase v. Alliance Ins. Co., 9 Allen 3IH (0864).
Authority of master: Crawford v. Roberts, So Cal. 235 (1875); but cf.,
Cupisino v. Perez, 2 Dal. (Pa.) 194 (1793). The contrast between these
decisions indicates the growth of law away from its original standard.
Cf., Lord v. Hazeltine, 67 Me. 399 (1877); Brown v. Gilmore, go Pa. 40
(1879), where defendant complained of the common law rule of contribu-
tory negligence, after verdict for the plaintiff.
"Collisions: New York Harbor T. B. Co. v. N. Y. L. E. and W. R. R.
Co., 148 N. Y. 574 (1896); The Arctic Ins. Co. v. Austin, 69 N. Y. 470
(1877); Sawyer v. Eastern S. B. Co., 46 Me. 400 (1859); Union SS. Co. v.
Nottingham, 7 Gratt. 115 (1866), but see n. 76; cf. Simpson v. Hand,
6 Whart. 311 (i84o). Fellow-servant rule as to seamen's injuries: Kalleck
v. Peering. 161 Mass'. 469 (1894); cf. Gabrielson v. Waydell, 135 N. Y.
1 (1892). Salvage: Cf., Hunter v. St. L and M. T. Co., 25 Mo. Api. 66o;
The Albany City Ins. Co. v. Whitney, 70 Pa. 248 (1872).
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drawn from the peculiar death act cases it was a step in continu-
ation of previous steps already taken by the Supreme Court.
To summarize the whole matter:-The operative field of
maritime lav expanded, and resort to admiralty court's became,
more frequent. The existence of that law as a uniform system
was threatened by the enforcement in state courts of their own
divergent lien laws. The Supreme Court restored uniformity in
large part by denying to state courts all jurisdiction over such
proceedings. A condition of local non-uniformity existed with
reference to liens for necessaries furnished a vessel in her home
port. When from this condition the deduction was drawn that
the states might go further and create liens having a non-local
application, the Supreme Court sharply lipited their power in this
respect.78 When the Supreme Court overrode-the growing ad-
miralty law with common law conceptions in The Harrisburg, the
lower courts restored a second best uniformity by applying local
death acts more alike, perhaps, in the fact that they gave a right
of action than differer't in their. various details. Lastly,-the
Supreme Court once more appearFing as hero,--when the state
courts sought to enforce their own diverse law (unreasonably so
by temporary hypothesis) upon defendants who had not willingly
sought their forums, the Supreme Court declared that this might
not be done. It may not have acted within a then common* legal
tradition, but in pifeiring the uniformity of the maritime.law
to the diversity.o'f .state law it acted within the scope of a far
greater historical tradition and did exactly what it had done
before.
Though of minor importance no doubt, it did not in so doing
strike across the written word. The familiar dicta of Justice
Bradley,7 in The' Lottauanna deserve quotation, for this was one
of the few cases where a judge in the Supreme Court envisaged
our maritime law as a whole.
The question before the court was whether the doctrine of
The General Smith so (that our maritime law gave no lien for
73 U. OF PA. L REv. 140.
" The Loitawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 572, 574, 575 (874).
"4 Wheat. 438 (18t9). ""
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necessaries furnished a vessel in her home port) should be over-
ruled. After pointing out reasons why this should not be done Is
and (in effect) that the maritime law of each country was not part
of a general system of superior sanction to that of its own govern-
ment, and might well differ from the general maritime rule in
matters on the outside boundaries of the maritime law "where it
comes in contact with, or shades off into the local or municipal law
of the particular country and affects only its own merchants or
people in their relations to each other," Justice Bradley further
said: " . . the convenience of the commercial world, bound
together as it is, by mutual relationg of trade and intercourse, de-
mands that in all essential things wherein those relations bring
them in contact, there shoul d be a uniform law founded on natural
reason and justice. * . . That we have a maritime law of our own,
operative throughout the United States, cannot be doubted. The
general system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers
and statesmen of the country when the Constitution was adopted,
*as Most certainly intended and referred to when it was declared
in that instrument that the judicial power of the United States
'hall extend.'t all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'"
,After 'oifiting out that the Constitution does not indicate the
criterion by which this law shall be determined, he continues:
"One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must
have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating
uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been
the intention to Place the rules and limits of maritime law under
the disposal and regulation of the several states, as that .would
tave, defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Con-
stitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting
the intercourse of the states with each other or with foreign
states." 82 Furthermore, twenty-four .years befoi6 the Jensctt
"Seen. 4o.
"Justice White in Vorkman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552, 558 (xgoo),
refusing to apply in an adm-ralty case a rule of New York State as to non-
liability, said that if the state law were given effect "there would be no gen-
eral maritime law for the redress of wrongs, as such law would be neces-
sarily one thing in one state and one thing in another; one thing in one part
of the United States and a different thing in some other part . .. It would
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case, almost the very language used by Justice McReynolds in stat-
ing the major premise was uttered by Judge Addison Brown in
the Southern District of New York in a decision affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, and singularly enough, a death act
case. s
It would be possible to instance other examples either of the
operation of the doctrine of uniformity or of the contrary, but
these all relate to comparatively minor matters or to matters in-
volving the working out in detail of what has already been dis-
cussed. The part played by federal legislation might be expanded
into a book by itself. Though Congress has often failed to unify
the maritime law where opportunity offered, or has done so only
very slowly, the only striking instances where it has acted directly
against the ideal are those resulting from the decisions of the
Jensen case and its successors."4  These may be explained, how-
ever, on the ground of a dislike of the minor premise. On the
come to pass that the maritime law affording relief for wrongs done, instead
of being general and ever abiding, would be purely local-would be one thing
today and another tomorrow. That the confusion to result would amount
to the abrogation of a uniform maritime law is at once patent."
Justice Brown, in The Roanoke, 189 U. S. x85, 195 (i9o3), holding that
a statute of the State of Washington purporting to give a maritime lien to a
subcontractor, was ineffective in an admiralty court (therefore ineffective
altogether) as to a vessel registered in Chicago, said of the master of such
a vessel: "Wilh full authority to bind the vessel, his position is such that
it is almost impossible for him to acquaint himself with the laws of each
individual state he may visit, and he has a right to suppose that the general
maritime law applies to him and his ship, wherever she may go, unhampered
by laws which are mainly intended for local application, or for domestic
vessels."
These are no doubt merely dicta as to proceedings in state courts, but
their reasoning applies with equal force when local state law is being ap-
plied against a defendant in such a court.
"* The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed. 98. io5 (Dist. Ct., S. D., N. Y., 1893),
6i Fed. 364 (Circ. Ct. App., 2d Circ., 8894).
"Act Oct. 6. 1917, c. 97 (4o Stat. at L. 395) ; see Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (192o). Act June 10. 1922, C. 216 (42 Stat. at L. 634) ;
see State of Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. lo9 (1924). Some may be-
lieve that certain sections of the Seamen's Act (Mar. 4, 1915, S, 153, 38 Stat.
at L. 1865) and of the "Jones" Act (June 5, 1920, C. 250, esp. Sec. 28, (41
Stat. at L. 988, 99) are of this nature. See also Act June 5, 1920, c. 250,
Sec. 33 (4x Stat. at L 8oo7), held constitutional in Panama R. R. Co. v.
Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (1924).
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other hand there is the limited liability act," the adoption of the
international rules of the road "" and of the stand-by and salvage
act,87 the enactment of the Lien Act in 1910,5s doing away to a
large extent with the such non-uniformity as resulted from the
recognition of the enforceability of domestic lien laws, and of the
Death Act of 1920, in which. however, Congress only went part
way.89 Similarly, so far as the ideal of -uniformity as a whole is
concerned, much might be said of the strong movement towards
uniformity of maritime law as a whole, manifested largely by the
work of the International Maritime Committee, and of the Mari-
time Law Committee of the Inteinational Law Association.9
Rules formulated as to carriage of goods by sea have already
been, with but slight modifications, enacted by Parliament,9 and
are now before Congress. Curiously enough, an act of Congress
"Act Mar. _, i851, and as amended; R. S., Secs. 4282-9; 23 Stat. at L.
57, Sec. 18; 24 Stat. at L. So, Sec. 4. The Supreme Court did not recognize
limited liability, as part of our maritime law although it was part of the
general maritime law (. Danjon, Dr. Mar., Secs. 565, 566, 567, 59; 2 Ripert.
Dr. Mar., pI. i69 et scq.). and had been applied as such in the lower federal
courts: The Rcbecca, i Ware 187 (Dist. Ct., Me., 1831).
"Cf. The Delaware, i6i U. S. 459 (x896).
"Act Sept. 4, i8go, c. 875, 26 Stat. at L. 425; Act of Aug. 1, 1912, c.
268, Sec. 1, 37 Stat. at L, 242.
"Act. June 23, 1910, c. 373, 30 Stat. at L. 604; cf. Act June 5, 192%
C. 250, Sec. 30, 41 Stat. at L. W8.
"Act Mar. 30, 1920, C. 111, 41 Stat. at L 537.
"Hague Rules: 33 REv. INT. DE DR. MAR. 178, 261, 495, 5o2, 684, 701,
976; i REv. DE DR. MAR. Comp. 652; 2 id. 25, 37, "20, 722; 3 id. 617, 618,
627, 632; 4 id. 13, 49, 55; 7 id. 29; 8 id. 366.
Brussells Convention of September 23, i91o, as to Collision at Sea. See
Jacques Arriu, L'Unification du Droit Maritime, Toulouse, j913, pp. 15 et scq.;
3 Ripert, Dr. Mar., 2d ed., Sects. 2o63 ct scq., with bibliography and list of
nations adopting it. not including ourselves.
Assistance at Sea: Arriu, op. cit., pp. 2o et seq.
Immunity of state-owned merchant vessels: 34 REv. INt. DE DR. MAI. 1,
21, 24, 47, 47i, 52o; 2 REv. DE DR. MAR. COMP. 25, 29, 721; 3 id. 6o8; 4 id.
595, 7 id. 32.
York-Antwerp Rules (General Average) 1 REv. nE DF. MAIL CoMP.
1, 638; 2 id. 719; 7 id. 31, 6o; 8 id. 1, 616.
Compulsory insurance of passengers: 7 REv. DE DRorr MAR. Comp. 64&
In general. z REV. DE DR. MAR. COMp. 53; 2 id. 48; 4 id. 64; 7 id. 33,
645; 8 id. 668; Bulletin No. 47, International Maritime Committee, Ant-
werp, 1921.
See also bibliographies relating to uniformity in maritime law: Arriu.
op. cit. 165; 1 Ripert -Dr. Mar. 2d ed., 83-9r; 2 REv. nE DR. MAR. "CMP.
783. 788; 3 id. 633; 4-id. 628; s id. 624; 7 id. 659, 661; 8 id. 679.
K 14 & i5 Geo. _, c. 22.
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in 1893,92 tending certainly towards diversity of a sort at the
time it was passed, has now proved an agent towards uniformity.
The general principles expressed in the Harter Act, representing
as they did a compromise between shipper and carrier, were the
basis of the rules in question and are now largely the law of
England.
In conclusion, therefore, I submit that the doctrine of uni-
formity is a part of our law, not merely because it has been made
so by the Tensen case and its successors,93 but because of the tend-
ehcy of that law as a whole throughout all its past history. Fur-
thermore, it is so deeply a part of our law that we should no longer
concern ourselves overmuch with questions as to its legal exist-
ence. It is far more worth while to consider how far the existing
particularism of our maritime law comports with the doctrine, and,
"Act Feb. 13, 1893, c. io5, 27 Stat. at L 445.
"Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 2o5 (1917); Chelentis v.
Luckenbach SS. Co., 247 U. S. 372 (i918) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
2;3 U. S. iio (irao); Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode. 247 U. S.
469 (1922) ; Carlyle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255 (1922); State
Jndustrial Com. v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 (92); State of Wash-
ington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219 (i9z4); Robins Dry Dock and Repair Co. v.
Dahl, 45 S. Ct. R. i56 (1925).
Cf., Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 1o9 (1924). It has
been contended that this case militated against the doctrine of uniformity
(see 37 HARv. L. Rav. ixi8). There the Supreme Court (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting) held that plaintiff's application to the state court of New York
for an order directing defendant to join with it in an arbitration of a dis-
pute arising out of a charter 'party, executed in New York between the
parties, pursuant to an agreement to that effect in the charter party was
properly granted. The state court had purported to act under the Arbitration
Law of New York (April 19, 192o, c. 275, amended Mar. 1, 1921, C. 14).
Justice Brandeis, in the opinion of the court, pointed out that in admiralty
agreements to submit controversies to arbitration are valid, although "The
agreement whether executory or executed, cannot be enforced in admiralty by
specific performance; merely because that court lacks the power to grant
equitable relief. The Eclipse, i35 U. S. 599, 6o8." In short, the state law
does not differ from the admiralty law, although the state, being able to v'ro-
vide the remedy of specific performance as the admiralty cannot, alone may
put into effective operation this now-diverse law, when the arbitration agree-
ment is executory. Even assuming the state law to be diverse, an unwilling
defendant is not being forced to submit to it against his will, having agreed
in the charter party to do what the state compels him to do. And again,
even though we assume that' defendants who make such agreements may,
under this case, be subject to diverse state laws, the vital thing is that the
agreement to arb'trate is enforceable. This result (as in the death act cases)
results, it would seem, in a "second-best" sort of uniformity. See, for the
effect of arbitration, clauses in maritime matters abroad: 2 Ripert, Dr.
Mar., 2d ed., Sec. 1460; 3 id., Sec. 2447; 34 Rav. I T. DE DJ. MAI. 11 2.
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"..r tie economists, how far it is in itself desirable. A successful
blow at the doctrine would, I venture to say, shatter the whole
fabric of our admiralty and maritime system. Perhaps, because
of isolationist policies and the increased importance of states'
rights (granting their truth), it ought to be shattered, but that is
a different problem and for others to settle. Certainly such a blow
would bring added justification to the strictures of Justice Holmes
as to admiralty jurisdiction and maritime law.14 The doctrine of
uniformity, however, may furnish a basis for making those stric-
tures no longer deserved. Granting its continued existence, our
immediate problem is to consider how far our existing law com-
ports with the doctrine and wherein that law ought to be changed.
Lacking a complete report on maritime conditions as they now
are, let us postulate the facts as best we may, and discuss how far
that law corresponds to the uniformity that they make desirable.
Austin Tappan Wright.
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
,"The precise scope of admirlty jurisdiction is not a matter of obvious
principle or of very accurate history." Th~e Blackheath, 195 U3. S. 369 (i904) ;
"The maritime law is not a corpus Juris--it is a very limited body of cus-
toms and ordinances of the sea:' Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 24 U. S.
205, 220 (1904).
